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INTRODUCTION 
Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980 at least in part because of 
President Carter's perceived failure to deal effectively with the Iranian hostages 
issue that had plagued the final months of his single-term presidency. Zbigniew 
Brzezinski, Carter's National Security Advisor, conceded in his memoirs that, 
"largely because of the economy and the Iranian issue, the public lost confidence 
in Carter's leadership."1 Theodore White, the noted chronicler of presidential 
campaigns, concluded that Carter's political future "probably died on the desert 
sands of Iran with the eight brave soldiers who gave their lives trying to free the 
American Hostages."2 
In greeting the returning hostages at the beginning of his first term in office, 
Reagan vowed: "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international 
behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution."3 
Four years later, after US aircraft intercepted and forced the surrender of the Achille 
Lauro hijackers, who had killed an American citizen on board the ship, President 
Reagan asserted that "terrorists may run, but they cannot hide."4 
Illustrating the administration's intended emphasis, the Public Report of the 
Vice-President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism stated in 1986 that, "one of 
the first things we discovered is that Americans view terrorism as one of the most 
serious problems facing our government, ranking it alongside such issues as the 
budget deficit and strategic arms control."5 Two years earlier the president's second 
Secretary of State, George Shultz, had stated: "We cannot allow ourselves to 
become the Hamlet of nations, worrying endlessly over whether and how to 
respond."6 Given these tough, public positions, it is legitimate to examine critically 
the Reagan administration's record in countering terrorism. This essay will attempt 
to do so, by evaluating the effectiveness of the administration's policies and actions 
in terms of its own publicly-stated criteria. 
According to the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, 
in its 1988 report, "the first element of our counterterrorism policy is that we do not 
make concessions of any kind to terrorists." In addition, it stated that "we 
vigorously encourage other countries to be firm with terrorists, for a solid 
international front is essential to overall success." This policy of no concessions 
was instituted because "to accommodate terrorist demands ... would only lead to 
more terrorism."7 
According to the Reagan administration, "the second element of our strategy 
is to make state sponsors of terrorism pay a price for their actions." This could be 
accomplished either through military, political, diplomatic, or economic means.8 
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"Third, the US Government has developed a program of action based on 
practical measures... to bring terrorists to justice, to disrupt their operations, and to 
destroy their networks." This anti- and counterterrorist strategy "includes aggres-
sive measures, working with our friends and allies, to identify, track, apprehend, 
prosecute, and punish terrorists by using the rule of law," as well as "measures 
designed to protect U.S. citizens abroad by strengthening security and research 
toward developing equipment to prevent terrorist incidents.'"' 
In the following pages the Reagan administration's effectiveness in manag-
ing some of the major counterterrorism policy issues will be analyzed in terms of 
these three policy goals it set for itself. First, however, it is essential to determine 
how the Reagan administration got to these positions in the first place. 
BACKGROUND 
From the outset, the issue of terrorism was not merely a foreign policy or 
military matter for the Reagan administration. It was also perceived as a major 
domestic political issue that would influence the president's image and chances for 
reelection in 1984.10 This approach was in stark contrast to those of previous 
administrations which, until the Iran hostage crisis, had treated terrorism as a policy 
issue of secondary priority. ' ' However, by elevating the matter of terrorism to such 
an important position, the president raised expectations for action and results which 
would be very difficult to deliver. Accordingly, the Reagan administration tuned 
down its initial rhetoric by late 1981. 
In those first years the administration was preoccupied with Central America. 
It felt that the USSR was presenting a major challenge in Nicaragua, and it did not 
want to permit communism to spread any further in the Western hemisphere.12 The 
CIA covertly launched actions against the Sandinistas by funding the Contras, a 
group of Nicaraguan expatriates trained by Argentine military advisers. A great 
deal of effort was also expended in trying to win the war against the leftist rebels in 
El Salvador.'^ 
In June 1982, however, Israel invaded Lebanon, an action that ultimately 
would redefine the American role in the Middle East and alter the direction of the 
administration's policy on terrorism. By invading Lebanon, Israel temporarily 
solved some of its most serious terrorist problems, but, in effect, created new ones 
for the United States. 
When the Israeli invasion led to a stalemate in August 1982, the US deployed 
marines to Lebanon first to assist in the peaceful removal of the PLO and second, 
after the massacres at the Sabra and Chatilla refugee camps in Beirut, to help 
stabilize the country. The second marine deployment was part of a multinational 
peacekeeping force that included troops from France, Italy, and Britain. Secretary 
of State George Shultz tried to devise a policy by which the multinational force 
would pacify the situation to a degree sufficient to permit the withdrawal of the 
Israeli soldiers and the restoration of a Lebanese Christian/Muslim coalition 
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government.14 Unfortunately for this policy, the Lebanese army the US Marines 
were supporting was dominated by a Christian minority that had no tradition of 
acting as an unbiased national force. In time, therefore, the Muslims came to distrust 
the US role and wanted the Americans out. 
On 18 April 1983, the US Embassy in Beirut was partially destroyed by a car 
bomb that killed 86, while wounding 100. Among those killed were several of the 
CIA's best Middle East intelligence officers who had been in Beirut for a meeting. 
In the succeeding weeks the marines began to receive sniper fire and grenade 
attacks. The marines responded first with fire from their own weapons, and later 
received naval gunfire support from ships offshore. In September 1983, the shelling 
of the nearby Muslim-populated hills by the US Navy, carried out to prevent the 
defeat of the Lebanese Army, convinced the Lebanese Muslims that the US had 
joined the Christian side in the civil war. This, and the casualties from the naval 
bombardment, made the marines a logical target for revenge.15 
On 23 October 1983, as the Reagan administration was preparing its 
invasion of Grenada, a lone Muslim terrorist drove a truckload of explosives into 
the marine headquarters at the Beirut airport killing 241 of them. It was the greatest 
loss suffered by the marines on any single day since World War II.1* 
Outrage and grief swept the nation, but against whom could the administra-
tion strike back? Impeded by the killing of some of its best Mideast experts in the 
April bombing of the embassy, the intelligence community was unable to come up 
with any certain identification of who was responsible. The president was 
beginning to learn the same lesson that his predecessor had learned in Iran, the 
limitations of US power. How can you retaliate against terrorists who have no 
known address?17 
The marines' deaths in Beirut proved to be the major watershed in the 
development of the Reagan administration's counterterrorism policy. They led to 
the president's approval of National Security Decision Directive 138 (NSDD 138) 
on 3 April 1984. This directive constituted a decision to expand the range of US 
counterterrorism options. The options approved under NSDD 138 included: overt 
and covert intelligence operations to predict, deter, and respond to terrorist attacks; 
military operations to retaliate against those responsible for attacks against Ameri-
cans; efforts to strengthen US criminal laws regarding those perpetrating terrorist 
acts against Americans; diplomatic actions to encourage greater international 
cooperation; and economic sanctions against regimes aiding terrorists. Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense Noel Koch claimed that NSDD 138 represented "a 
quantum leap in countering terrorism."18 
Secretary of State Shultz elaborated on this new policy in a major address 
before the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City on 25 October 1984. Praising 
the activist Israeli record, he declared that "no nation had more experience with 
terrorism than Israel, and no nation has made a greater contribution to our 
understanding of the problem and the best ways to confront it." He argued that "we 
9 
Spring 1994 
should understand that terrorism is aggression and, like all aggression, must be 
forcefully resisted." Therefore, "our responses should go beyond passive defense 
to consider means of active prevention, preemption, and retaliation," and "our goal 
must be to prevent and deter future terrorist acts.... Experience has taught us over 
the years that one of the best deterrents to terrorism is the certainty that swift and 
sure measures will be taken against those who engage in it."19 
Shultz went on to emphasize that "there is no question about our ability to use 
force where and when it is needed to counter terrorism," and even added that "the 
public must understand before the fact that occasions will come when their 
government must act before each and every fact is known." Although he admitted 
that "we may never have the kind of evidence that can stand up in an American court 
of law," the Secretary of State argued that "a great nation with global responsibilities 
cannot afford to be hamstrung by confusion and indecisiveness." In language 
reminiscent of John Foster Dulles' policy of massive retaliation, Shultz also argued 
that "we will need the flexibility to respond to terrorist attacks in a variety of ways, 
at times and places of our own choosing."20 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, however, opposed Shultz's activ-
ist approach, arguing that "preemptive ... retaliation would be analogous to firing 
a gun in a crowded theater in the slim hope of hitting the guilty party."21 During 
the following four years, Weinberger continued to oppose the employment of US 
military forces against terrorists because of the "post-Vietnam syndrome," the fear 
within the Defense Department that military force would lead to a lengthy involve-
ment like the Vietnam War that would alienate public opinion. Barely one month 
after Shultz had called for force against the terrorists, Weinberger declared that US 
forces should be committed to combat only as a last resort when vital US national 
interests were at stake and when there was a "reasonable assurance of support by 
Congress and the public."22 
In opposing Shultz on this issue, the Secretary of Defense also might have 
asked what type of terrorism the Shultz doctrine would be employed against: state, 
state-sponsored, insurgent, radical fundamentalist, or mere random acts wherever 
they occurred? If the target was the state-sponsored variety, such strikes might be 
illegal, and would even stamp the US itself as a "terrorist" state. Indeed, later 
revelations that the CIA had trained and funded the Lebanese intelligence officers 
who set off a car bomb that killed 92 people in Beirut in March 1985,23 indicated the 
dangers inherent in pursuing the policy that Shultz was advocating. 
What is more, the Shultz doctrine did not adequately deal with a state such 
as Lebanon whose territory was being used by terrorists, but was itself not 
supporting their activities. Was Lebanon responsible for the terrorism carried out 
by the PLO against Israel or that unleashed against the US marines on its territory? 
To assert that it was and punish it accordingly, would obviously be wrong and lead 
to the deaths of innocent civilians. Once again, the administration felt itself unable 
to act. The complexities apparent in the Lebanese situation also plagued US 
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counterterrorism policy as a whole. The essay will now examine three of these in 
greater detail. 
NO CONCESSIONS 
In its review and evaluation of current policy and programs, the Vice 
President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism declared that "the U.S. Govern-
ment will make no concessions to terrorists," because "to give in to terrorists' 
demands places even more Americans at risk. This no-concessions policy is the best 
way of ensuring the safety of the greatest number of people."24 
Nevertheless, declaratory policies inevitably require caveats. The Task 
Force Report stated that under certain conditions, negotiations leading to 
understandings that defuse the situation may indeed be appropriate.25 It is in this 
light that the Reagan administration under pressure to "do something" about the 
Americans taken hostage in Lebanon, probably decided to negotiate with Iran,26 the 
very nation that had held US diplomats hostage for 444 days and later was believed 
to be involved in the attack on the US Marines in Beirut. 
When the arms for hostages deal was exposed, the Reagan administration's 
actions looked hypocritical. Not only had it vowed never to make concessions to 
terrorists, but it also had criticized its allies for doing so.27 The administration's 
behavior angered and confused audiences at home and abroad, and undermined 
confidence in the administration's antiterrorist policy. Nothing could destroy the 
credibility of the president more than his administration's violation of its own 
supposed standards. 
Furthermore, the Iran affair demonstrated a policy making process in which 
junior officials of the National Security Council Staff were able to formulate and 
implement an antiterrorist policy completely outside the established laws and 
procedures.28 Reagan's inability adequately to explain his subordinate's behavior 
fostered accusations of presidential incompetency. Critics took the view that if he 
did not know what was going on, he should have.29 
Although the present analysis has suggested that it is not entirely fair to blame 
the Reagan administration for the Iran-Contra concessions to terrorism, the public 
verdict has. Musing over what had happened, Morris D. Busby, the Coordinator of 
Counter-Terrorism in the Reagan administration, agreed: "the Iran-contra affair... 
was a mistake, but for the past 3 years we have made crystal clear our steadfast 
commitment to the 'no deals' principle."30 
The hard line taken by the administration on Libya and the Achille Lauro 
incident (discussed below) may be seen as an affirmation of this position of "no 
concessions." A similar view may be taken of the administration's decision in 1985 
to support a treaty with Britain designed to make it easier to extradite suspected IRA 
terrorists.31 As British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher said: "What is the point 
of the United States taking a foremost part against terrorism and then not being as 
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strict as they can against Irish terrorism which afflicts one of their allies?"32 The 
treaty was ratified in 1986. 
STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM 
Soviet Union 
The first days of the Reagan administration witnessed public statements 
accusing the Soviet Union of directing a so-called international terrorist network. 
Commentators such as Claire Sterling, as well as Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander, 
tried to prove a "persistent strategic pattern of international destabilization and 
terrorism assisted by, if not always controlled by, Moscow."33 
These accusations were reminiscent of those made earlier by Ladislav 
Bittman and Jan Sejna former, high-ranking communist officials who had defected 
to the West. Both had maintained that the Soviet Union decided to support the 
terrorist activities of a wide variety of anti-American states and organizations, as a 
long-term method of defeating the West.34 Moreover, as late as 1985, in a speech 
to the American Bar Association, the president himself implied that the Soviet 
Union encouraged a "confederation of terrorist states," comprised of Iran, Libya, 
North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua, which formed "a new international version of 
Murder, Incorporated."35 
In an attempt to substantiate the allegations, the Subcommittee on Security 
and Terrorism of the Senate Judiciary Committee took up the issue, but its evidence 
was questionable at best.36 Indeed, in its ideological insistence on the Soviet role 
in fomenting terrorism, the Reagan administration created doubts about the ability 
of the US intelligence community to analyze objectively information on the subject. 
Several years later this would come back to haunt Robert Gates, before his 
appointment to be the new Director of the CIA was finally approved by the Senate 
in 1991.37 
In the long run, the Reagan administration would have been better served 
by appreciating the more complex nature of international terrorism. It is clear that 
the Soviet Union had ties to state sponsors of terrorism such as Syria, and assisted 
groups such as the PLO, and thus, was not averse to fishing in troubled waters. 
However, it is equally true that if the USSR had ceased to exist, as indeed it did 
at the end of 1991, terrorism would have continued, as indeed it has. The Soviet 
Union's role, therefore, was less central than the Reagan administration believed 
it to be. 
More cautious scholarly research has illustrated the problems in acquiring, 
verifying, and interpreting evidence regarding the Soviet role here.38 Classic works, 
such as Ted Robert Gurr's analysis of relative deprivation, Samuel P. Huntington's 
study of the process of modernization, and Frantz Fanon's investigation of the role 
of violence in ridding colonial peoples of their inferiority complexes still offer 
profound insights into the multicausal nature of international terrorism.39 
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As the reform process initiated by Gorbachev began to take effect in the 
Soviet Union and the Cold War "thawed," the Reagan administration, to its credit, 
reduced and then ceased its rhetoric about the Soviet sponsorship of international 
terrorism. Ironically, however, it is possible that the Reagan administration's 
propaganda offensive, even if it did overstate the case, played a role in undermining 
the seemingly impregnable Soviet Union. 
Libya 
The most visible action taken by the Reagan administration against a state 
sponsor of terrorism was the bombing of Libya by US aircraft on 4 April 1986. The 
air raid killed 37 civilians and wounded almost 100. Secretary of State Shultz 
justified the strike as an act of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
which states that: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of 
individual or collective self defense if an armed attack occurs against 
the Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has 
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security.40 
The Reagan administration argued that the following series of violent 
terrorist acts - which it claimed had been aided and abetted by Libya over the 
previous several months - constituted such an "armed attack" and thus justified 
"self-defense": the attacks on the Rome and Vienna airports in December 1985; the 
planting of a bomb on a TWA flight from Rome to Athens in April 1986; and the 
bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin filled with US servicemen in 
April 1986.41 
Although there can be no doubt that the Qaddafi regime had sponsored 
numerous terrorist outrages, the legal question was whether, from the point of view 
of international law such acts, if indeed sponsored or aided by Libya, constituted an 
"armed attack" by Libya, thereby legitimizing "self-defense" by the US. Legally, 
the American case was less than certain. Moreover, the tangible evidence that 
supposedly linked Libya to these acts were never made public, supposedly for 
reasons of national security.42 Given the willingness of the Reagan administration 
to mislead the American public by employing a disinformation campaign against 
Qaddafi later in 1986,43 one might reasonably query the validity of the evidence 
claimed at the time of the air raid. Although this deception did not mean necessarily 
that the evidence was tainted, it may have undercut the legal arguments presented 
by the US. Subsequent evidence that pointed to Syrian, rather than Libyan, 
involvement in the disco bombing44 cast further doubt on the legal validity of the 
American charge that Libya had carried out an "armed attack" against the US. 
Ironically, it was the US itself that clearly had carried out the kind of attack 
envisaged in Article 51 of the UN Charter. 
Was the US attack on Libya then a legal exercise of "self-defense" as the term 
is used in Charter Article 51 ? International law prescribes that two basic require-
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ments be met before "self-defense" can justify the usage of military force: first, 
actual necessity, and second, proportionality. The first provision means, as 
Secretary of State Daniel Webster so eloquently put it in 1841, that "it will be for 
that government to show a necessity of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving 
no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation."45 Judged by this criteria, the 
US action remains open to question. 
As for the principle of proportionality, international law requires that "one 
should certainly consider as excessive, and thus illegal, reprisals out of all propor-
tion with the act which motivated them."46 Even if all the alleged Libyan terrorist 
acts had actually been perpetrated, a point which remains unclear, it is difficult to 
argue mat the American air raid, which wounded and killed innocent civilians, was 
a proportionate response. Thus, the US action demonstrated the willingness of the 
Reagan administration to handle the issue of state-sponsored terrorism outside the 
strict bounds of international law. 
It also gambled that such an attack merely would not incite Libya to further 
acts of terrorism in revenge thus, inducing escalating cycles of strikes and 
counterstrikes in the Israeli fashion. Indeed, the American hostage Peter Kilbourn, 
held in Lebanon, was reportedly executed by Qaddafi's orders as a retaliation for 
the American attack. Moreover, Libya later was implicated in the bombing of Pan 
Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in 1988, an act believed to have been a 
reprisal for the air raid.47 
Finally, the American position left it open to charges of hypocrisy, when 
one month after the air raid it condemned South African raids on three African 
states in which members of the African National Congress were based. It is 
difficult to discern any substantive differences between these attacks and the 
American raid on Libya. 
On die other hand, it is also clear mat the raid on Libya illustrated the political 
resolve of the US to deal with the problem and was popular with the American 
people. In 1988 L. Paul Bremer III, the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, 
declared: "We believe mat as many as 35 attacks planned by Libya were averted 
wimin weeks after the attack."48 The previous year he had emphasized the political 
gains arising from the attack: 
Most important, the political environment was shifted. The Europe-
ans at long last had taken decisive action against a terrorist state. That 
was a major breakthrough in the development of a Western 
counterterrorist strategy.49 
ANTI- AND COUNTERTERRORIST MEASURES 
In response to the increasing threat posed by terrorists to American diplomats 
and their posts, the Secretary of State appointed the former Deputy Director of me 
CIA Admiral Bobby Inman to chair a blue ribbon Advisory Panel on Overseas 
Security. The 1985 Inman Report was highly critical of the State Department's 
14 
Conflict Quarterly 
handling of diplomatic security and terrorism, and recommended major improve-
ments in its intelligence, threat analysis, and alerting procedures. Most seriously, 
it found that numerous US embassies were vulnerable to terrorist attack and urged 
that many of them be rebuilt or relocated to make them safer.50 In response, the 
Reagan administration successfully implemented a major program to upgrade 
diplomatic security abroad. Using other recommendations from the Inman Report, 
the State Department also overhauled its counterterrorist structure. The Office for 
Counterterrorism and Emergency Planning, the Office of Security, and the Assist-
ant Secretary for Administration and Security were all replaced by the Office of the 
Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, the Director of Diplomatic Security 
Service, and the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, thus creating a greater distinction 
between security and counterterrorism functions.51 
On 9 December 1985, the UN General Assembly - with strong US support 
- passed its first unequivocal resolution condemning terrorism, by a consensus vote. 
Later that month the Security Council adopted a resolution initiated by the US which 
condemned unequivocally all acts of hostage-taking and urged the "further devel-
opment of international cooperation among states to facilitate the prevention, 
prosecution and punishment of hostage-taking as international terrorism."52 Al-
though these resolutions did not contain any enforcement procedures, they still were 
important because they were evidence of the developing international consensus 
that terrorism was an unacceptable mode of behavior. 
Important anti- and counterterrorist measures were also taken in the areas 
of aviation and maritime security. In June 1985, TWA Flight 847 was hijacked 
to Lebanon and one of the passengers, US Navy diver Robert Stethem, was 
murdered. Following this unfortunate event, the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO) quickly began to upgrade its "Standards and Recom-
mended Practices" for airport and aircraft security. In February 1988, the Reagan 
administration joined other ICAO members in signing in Montreal the "Protocol 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving Interna-
tional Civil Aviation." This new treaty supplemented and extended the purview 
of the Montreal Convention of 1971 by including acts committed at airports even 
when they did not endanger the actual safety of aircraft in flight.53 In June 1988, 
the ICAO Council adopted by consensus a resolution on a "no take-off policy 
which urged "each contracting state to take measures, as it may find practicable, 
to ensure that an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful seizure which has landed 
in its territory is detained on the ground."54 
Following the seizure of the liner Achille Lauro in October 1985, the 
International Maritime Organization, at the initiation of the Reagan administration, 
began efforts which led on 10 March 1988, to the signing in Rome of the 
"Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime 
Navigation." This measure was designed to offer greater protection for the 
passengers and crews aboard ships.55 
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Unfortunately, problems remained with the anti- and counterterrorist capaci-
ties of the US. During the hijacking of TWA 847 in June 1985, for example, the 
Reagan administration apparently was unable to mount a hostage rescue operation 
because of helicopter deficiencies. In addition, the US lacked an adequate military 
option during this incident because there were no crews qualified to fly night 
missions assigned to the 67th Air Rescue and Recovery Squadron, the only unit 
equipped with the helicopters required to perform a rescue operation, but stationed 
in Woodbridge, England.56 
Despite its rhetoric of "swift and effective retribution," more than four 
years after the failure of the Iranian hostages rescue mission, the US still lacked 
the required, counterterrorist special operations aircraft. Because they were few 
in number, special operations aircraft were expensive, and thus a threat to the 
conventional military budget. When they were needed, therefore, they were 
simply not available. According to US Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, "the 
primary culprit in this sad story, unfortunately, is the Air Force."" On the other 
hand, two US counterterrorist actions undertaken during the second Reagan 
administration succeeded because of timely and accurate intelligence. First, US 
planes were able to intercept the terrorists who had hijacked the Achille Lauro in 
international airspace because of intelligence collected by the National Security 
Agency and the Israelis and the navy's ability to find and track the aircraft 
carrying the fleeing terrorists.58 This operation proved to be one of the Reagan 
administration's principal successes. Second, Fawaz Younis, a Lebanese terrorist 
involved in at least two hijackings, was apprehended off the coast of Cyprus 
because good intelligence enabled the FBI to lure him away from his safe house 
to what he thought was a drug deal. He is now serving a thirty-year sentence in 
the US for hostage-taking, air piracy, and conspiracy.59 
CONCLUSIONS 
This article has analyzed the Reagan record in dealing with terrorism in 
terms of its own stated criteria of success: first, not making any concessions to 
terrorists; second, making state sponsors of terrorism pay a price for their actions; 
and third, developing anti- and counterterrorist measures to bring terrorists to 
justice. Judged by these criteria, the overall Reagan record in dealing with terrorism 
is mixed. Policies and actions that appeared to produce success included: a greater 
US public awareness of terrorism; a shift from international tolerance of terrorism 
to revulsion against it; an increased ability to alert Americans to potential terrorist 
threats that prevented a number of possible incidents; improved intelligence 
capabilities, which prevented hundreds of potential incidents and permitted the 
authorities to apprehend some perpetrators; the closing of statutory loopholes which 
enabled more terrorists to be apprehended; the actual apprehension, prosecution, 
and punishment of terrorists; and finally, unilateral US actions against terrorists, 
such as the hijackers of the Achille Lauro.60 
On the other hand, the number of anti-US terrorist incidents continued to 
increase during the Reagan years. Indeed, the president's final full year in office 
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proved to be the bloodiest ever with incidents in 1988 increasing by three percent 
over the previous year. The bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 made it the worst year 
for American casualties since the Beirut bombings of 1983.61 
Although the Iran-Contra affair clearly undermined the stated policy of no 
concessions to terrorists, this article noted that under certain circumstances, 
negotiations leading to understandings that defuse the situation may actually be 
appropriate. Indeed, it was in this light that the Reagan administration probably 
decided to discuss arms for hostages with Iran. The Reagan administration later 
confessed that its policies on Iran had been in error, but maintained that it had 
learned from its mistakes and had subsequently held firm in its commitment to the 
principle of no concessions. The tough position taken on the Achille Lauro incident 
may be seen as an affirmation of this commitment. 
Regarding the criterion of making state sponsors of terrorism pay a price for 
their actions, this article faulted the Reagan administration on the grounds that the 
US bombing of Libya could not be justified as self-defense and was not proportional 
to Libya's original offense. Nevertheless, the actions against Libya did illustrate the 
political resolve of the US to deal with the problem and were popular with the 
American people. 
With regard to the Reagan administration's third criterion of success, this 
article illustrates a number of important anti- and counterterrorist successes and 
failures. The former included measures to upgrade diplomatic security, and 
implement political and legal protections. Improved intelligence collection also 
enabled US planes to intercept the terrorists who had hijacked the Achille Lauro 
in international space, although the subsequent standoff at Sigonella Airport 
between US and Italian forces over which state would take jurisdiction over the 
terrorists almost fractured Italo-American relations. Other problems included 
difficulties in mounting successful rescue missions and gathering effective 
intelligence in Lebanon. 
Nevertheless, when Ronald Reagan left the White House in January 1989, 
the public perceived him as having successfully dealt with the terrorist threat. 
Although the legacy which he passed on to his successor George Bush actually was 
mixed, it still held many positive lessons for anyone who was willing to learn from 
past experience. 
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